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Abstract
This paper employs a standard new Keynesian model to compute the inﬂation/output
volatility frontier, i.e. the "Taylor curve". The computation is performed both under
equilibrium uniqueness and under indeterminacy. While under uniqueness the Taylor curve
looks like expected - i.e. a monotonically decreasing curve in the (σx,σπ) diagram -, under
indeterminacy a new result arises. We ﬁnd that the tighter is the monetary policy, the
higher is the inﬂation/output gap volatility. This is due to impact of systematic monetary
policy on inﬂation and output persistence. In fact, under indeterminacy a more aggressive
monetary policy causes an increase in inﬂation persistence, and augments its volatility.
The eﬀects on output tend to be of opposite sign. This ﬁnding is robust to diﬀerent
parameterization of the DSGE new-Keynesian monetary model employed. This result i)
oﬀers support the move from "passive" to "active" monetary policy as one of the possible
rationales for the Great Moderation, ii) underlines the need of a deeper understanding
of the link between systematic monetary policy and macroeconomic persistence, and iii)
warns against sub-samples pooling when performing macroeconometric analysis.
JEL classiﬁcation: E30, E52.
Keywords: Taylor principle, Taylor curve, new Keynesian model, indeterminacy, per-
sistence.
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Most monetary authorities aim at stabilizing inﬂation and the business cycle. The relative
importance attributed to the former objective with respect to the latter drives the choices
that monetary policymakers undertake to tackle the shocks that drive the variables of interest
oﬀ-targets. Taylor (1979) oﬀered a graphical syntesis of the impact of such preferences on the
targeted variables: The downward sloping curve collecting the diﬀerent pairs of inﬂation and
output volatilities - computed with a macroeconomic model in which the central bank varies
its aggressivity against inﬂation ﬂuctuations - has been labeled as "Taylor curve".1 The Taylor
curve shows that monetary authorities face a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and business cycle
stabilization: To move towards a scenario featured by a lower inﬂation volatility, a Society
must let the real side of the economy ﬂuctuate more (all else being equal).
This conclusion is typically reached in studies concentrating on equilibrium uniqueness.
However, it is well known that multiple equilibria may arise in an economy featured by the
presence of rational agents and in which monetary policy is approximated by a simple rule.
A case of particular interest is that concerning the workhorse new Keynesian model "closed"
with a policy rule a la Taylor (1993). In such a context, it is possible to deﬁne a threshold
measure for the reactiveness monetary authorities have to display for pinning down private
sector’s expectations and, consequently, uniquely determine the equilibrium values of inﬂation
and the output gap (Clarida et al, 2000; Woodford, 2003). Such a threshold is the basis for the
so-called "Taylor principle": Monetary authorities must raise the nominal interest rate more
than one-to-one in reaction to an upward shift in inﬂation in order to rule out self-fulﬁlling
expectations ﬂuctuations and stabilize inﬂation.
The goal of this paper is to understand how the Taylor curve looks like when the Taylor
principle is violated and monetary policy is therefore classiﬁable as "passive". Does a volatil-
ity trade-oﬀ still exist under multiple equilibria? Does it still work as under determinacy?
Although the relevance of these questions seem to be clear, to our knowledge no study in the
literature has attempted to answer them so far. We try to close this gap by employing a stan-
dard DSGE model in which a Taylor rule formalizes the behavior of the monetary authorities.
We investigate the case in which the Taylor principle is not met - i.e. passive monetary policy
-, and we contrast it with a more standard analysis in which inﬂation expectations are well
anchored by an aggressive policy conduct. Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2003,2004), we
deal with indeterminacy by imposing additional constraints on the dynamics of the system, so
selecting one solution out of all the multiple equilibria consistent with rational expectations.
1Taylor (1979) computed the Taylor curve by considering the unique optimal monetary policy under rational
expectation to be implemented in a set up in which an inﬂation targeter minimizes a loss function subject to
the structure of the economy. By contrast, this paper investigates the inﬂation/output volatility issue in a set
up in which monetary authorities follow a simple rule, and sunspot ﬂuctuations may arise when a weak policy
conduct is implemented.
2Another goal of this study is that of understanding if the joint reduction in inﬂation and
the business cycle volatilities may be attributed to such a switch in the systematic monetary
policy. Indeed, as far as the U.S. case is concerned, several researchers - e.g. Clarida et al
(2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Cogley and Sargent
(2005) - argue that monetary policy did not react aggressively enough to the inﬂationary shocks
hitting the American economy during the pre-’79 period.2 Then, it is not to be excluded that
this violation of the Taylor principle allowed for sunspot ﬂuctuations of inﬂation and output.
But the standard Taylor curve predicts that to lower the volatility of the former a Society
must accept larger ﬂuctuations of the real GDP. Does the move from a passive to an active
monetary policy trigger a reduction of both volatilities? A positive answer to this question
would oﬀer an alternative explanation to the empirical evidence pointing towards a paramount
decrease in the volatilities of inﬂation and the output gap in the last two decades, labeled by
Bernanke (2004) as the "great moderation".
We achieve the following results. First, under indeterminacy the tighter the monetary
policy, the higher is the inﬂation/output gap volatility. This is due to impact of systematic
monetary policy on inﬂation and output persistence. In fact, under indeterminacy the tigher
the policy, the higher the persistence of inﬂation, the larger its volatility. The eﬀects on
output seem to be of opposite sign. The move from passive to active monetary policy causes
a drop in macroeconomic persistence and volatility. Moreover, some policies may be Pareto-
superior with respect to others. Our ﬁndings tend to support i) the move from "passive"
to "active" monetary policy as one of the possible rationales for the Great Moderation, ii)
underline the need of a deeper understanding of the link between systematic monetary policy
and macroeconomic persistence, and iii) warn against sub-samples pooling when performing
macroeconometric analysis. This result is robust to several perturbations of the benchmark
model we employ.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and explains how we pick
up a single equilibrium under indeterminacy. Section 3 explains the algorithm we implement
for drawing the Taylor curve, and discusses the benchmark parameterization of the model.
Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes, and References follow. A
Technical Appendix is then provided.
2 The economic framework
In stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap, policymakers face the inﬂation/output volatility
trade-oﬀ. Taylor (1979) - and several subsequent contributions, see e.g. the papers collected
in Taylor (1999) - concentrate on the unique equilibrium implied by (each of the) optimal
monetary policy (ies) computed under rational expectation in a set up in which an inﬂation
2It must be acknowledged that this view is not uncontended, see e.g. Sims and Zha (2005).
3targeter minimizes a loss function subject to the structure of the economy. Our analysis relaxes
the assumption of equilibrium uniqueness, and employes a simple policy rule to represent the
policymakers behavior both under determinacy and under weak monetary policy.





















Rt = ρππt + ρyxt + εMP
t (3)
where x stands for real output, π represents the growth rate of the relevant aggregate
price index, R the short term nominal interest rate, and επ
t ,ε x
t ,a n dεMP
t are zero-mean i.i.d.




Eq. (1) is the Euler equation maximizing the proﬁts of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
whose discount factor is identiﬁed by the parameter β. We assume a staggered price setting
regulated by a Calvo-type mechanism, i.e. there is a probability θ for a ﬁrm of not reoptimizing
its price in each period. Among the ﬁrms who cannot reoptimize, there is a fraction w that
automatically adjust the price level according to a mechanical rule, i.e. Pj,t = πt−1Pj,t−1,
where j is the ﬁrm-index.4 The parameter expressing the link between demand ﬂuctuations
and inﬂation reactions is a convolution of the already presented structural parameters, i.e.
κ ≡
(σ+η)(1−θ)(1−θβ)
(1+wβ)θ . Finally, we admit the presence of a cost-push shock επ
t .
Eq. (2) is a log-linearized IS curve stemming from the household’s intertemporal problem
in which consumption and bond holdings are the control variables. Contemporaneous output is
caused both by expectations on future realizations of the business cycle and by its past values.
The ex-ante real interest rate exerts a direct, contemporaneous impact on the cycle. The
coeﬃcient b regulates the importance of (external) habits in the household’s utility function,
and concurs to "weight" the just mentioned elements.5 The shock εx
t may be interpreted as a
demand shock, or a shock to household’s preferences.
3The variables of the model are expressed in percentage deviation with respect to their steady state values.
4Notice that there exists a diﬀerence between the adjustment mechanims embedded in this model and the
rule-of-thumb behavior a la Galí et al (2001). In this model ﬁrms who cannot reoptimize in a given period
adopt an automatic adjustment a al Christiano et al (2005). By contrast, the rule-of-thumb behavior a la Galí
et al (2001) applies to ﬁrms who are able to reoptimize.
5In this set up, the preferences of the representative consumer are identiﬁed by the following utility function:
u(Ct,X)=
(Ct−Ht)1−σ
1−σ + f(X), where Ht = bCt−1 and X is the bunch of remaining arguments aﬀecting
consumer’s utility.
4Eq. (3) is an interest rate rule according to which the central bank adjusts the policy rate
in response to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and the output gap. We interprest the random variable
εx
t as the monetary policy shock.
It is well known that the linear rational expectations model (1)-(3) can be associated to a
unique solution as long as the Taylor principle is satisﬁed, i.e. the condition ρπ > 1−
(1−β)
κ ρy
is met (Clarida et al, 2000; Woodford, 2003). By contrast, if ρπ ≤ 1 −
(1−β)
κ ρy, monetary
authorities are unable to uniquely pin down private sector’s expectations, and there is room
for self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations triggered by sunspot shocks hitting the economy.6 Formally, in
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is the vector of l fundamental shocks, ζt is the sunspot shock hitting the economy. As shown
by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003,2004), under uniqueness V.2 =0 [lx1], then the last two terms
of (4) drop out and the equilibrium values of the variables belonging to the vector st are
completely identiﬁed by the structure of the economy. By contrast, under indeterminacy the
i.i.d. zero mean sunspot shock ζt -w h o s ev a r i a n c ei sσ2
ζ -i n ﬂuences households’ expectations
and, consequently, the equilibrium values of inﬂation, the output gap, and the policy rate.
Notice that in this scenario the matrix f M may aﬀect the transmission mechanism linking the
structural shocks to the variables of the system. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) propose to
compute such matrix by requiring that the on-impact reaction of the endogenous variables st
to the shocks εt be as close as possible to the one on the frontier dividing the parameter space
into determinacy and indeterminacy, a scenario labeled as "continuity".7 As an alternative,
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) consider the possibility of setting f M =0 [1xl], a scenario labeled
as "orthogonality". In drawing the Taylor curve under indeterminacy we will alternatively
employ these two identiﬁcation schemes.
6To understand why, suppose that inﬂation expectations suddenly raise merely due to a sunspot shock. Ac-
cording to the Phillips curve (1), inﬂation should raise, but the policy rate reacts as well given the prescriptions
of the Taylor rule (3). However, since the Taylor principle is not met, the real expected interest rate eventually
decreases and boosts the real side of the economy. Eventually, inﬂation is pushed up by the demand channel.
Hence, in equilibrium inﬂation is oﬀ-target even if no structural shock has hit the economy.
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εMP] is the vector of the parameters of the model, h θ =[ i ρπ,...,σ
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εMP] is a "manipulated" vector
whose only diﬀerent element with respect to θ is i ρπ =1−
(1−β)















See the Technical Appendix for more details.
53 Drawing the Taylor Curve
T od r a wt h eT a y l o rc u r v e ,w ei m p l e m e n tt h ef o l l o w i n ga l g o r i t h m .F i r s t ,w eﬁxt h ev a l u e so f
ρπ and ρx. Then, given the calibration of the structure of the model, we compute the rational
expectation solution. Notice that, in case of ρπ ≤ 1 −
(1−β)
κ ρx, we select one of the multiple
solutions consistent with rational expectations by choosing either "continuity" or "orthogo-
nality" (as described in the previous Section). At that point, the unconditional volatilities
of inﬂation and the output gap are computed by constructing samples of 110,000 simulated
observations (whose initial 10,000 observations are then discarded as burn-in observations).
We then store the results, perturb the value of ρπ, and repeat all the steps.8 Finally, we
collect all the pairs of inﬂation-output volatilities conditional to a given parameterization of
the structural model (1)-(2) and a given value of ρx.
We now turn to our benchmark calibration of the model (1)-(3). Regarding the Phillips
curve, we ﬁx the discount factor β =0 .99, as commonly done in the literature in case of models
for quarterly frequencies. The degree of price indexation w i ss e tt ob ee q u a lt o0.90,a si n
Rabanal (2006) and close to the "full indexation" hypothesis by Christiano et al (2005). We
select a Calvo-parameter θ equal to 0.80 as in Rabanal (2006) and Christiano et al (2005), and
slighly higher than the one proposed by Galí et al (2003). As far as households’ risk aversion
and labor elasticities are concerned, we select σ =1and η =1 , fairly standard values in the
literature.9 Moving to the IS curve, we impose a degree of habit formation b = .65 (in line with
Christiano et al, 2005; Rabanal, 2005; Dennis, 2005), which implies an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution equal to 0.2121, very similar to the set of estimates proposed by Fuhrer and
Rudebusch (2004). The Taylor rule is featured by ρπ ranging from 0 to 2,w h i l eρx assumes
av a l u eb e l o n g i n gt ot h es e t{0,0.25,0.5,1}. Finally, to calibrate our volatilities we refer to
the study by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) in which a model similar to (1)-(3) is estimated
under passive monetary policy. In particular, we set σ2
επ =1 .16,σ2
εx =0 .21, σ2
εMP =0 .24, and
the volatility of the sunspot σ2
ζ =0 .24. We now turn to the presentation and comment of our
results.
4R e s u l t s
Figure 1 displays the Taylor curves computed under uniqueness in the benchmark scenario
conditional of four diﬀerent values of the parameter ρx. As expected, the Taylor curve depicts
a monotonically decreasing function in the (σx,σπ) diagram, i.e. the higher is the systematic
reaction of the nominal interest rate in eq. (3), the lower the inﬂation/output gap volatility
8We vary ρπ in the sub-domain [0,2], and adopt a step-length equal to 0.1.
9These values imply an inverse of the sacriﬁce ratio κ =0 .0352, lower than other values present in the
literature, e.g. 0.10 as in Ireland (2004). However, notice that the sacriﬁce ratio is inversely related to the
degree or relative risk aversion σ, which will be augmented by a factor of 5 in the robustness check.
6ratio (all else being equal). This is "conventional wisdom" in the literature [see for instance
some of the contributions in Taylor (1999)].10
[insert Figure 1 about here]
The picture dramatically changes when the Taylor principle is not met (Figure 2).11 In
fact, the world under indeterminacy turns upside down. Under indeterminacy, the higher the
reaction of the policy rate to inﬂation ﬂuctuations, the higher the inﬂation/output volatility
ratio! Interestingly, this ﬁnding holds both under orthogonality and under continuity. More-
over, by looking at the values of the volatilities plotted in Figure 2, we can notice that this
ﬁnding becomes more clear the higher is the reaction of the policy rate to the oscillations of
the output gap. This is due to the much higher volatility of inﬂation positively triggered by
ρx, that "stretches" the Taylor curve and renders even more clear the surprising behavior of
the curve. Moreover, we can also observe some "zig-zags" that are typically not present when
monetary policy is active. In other words, the curves are not necessarily monotonic. This is a
strong result, because it implies that some policies are Pareto-superior with respect to others.
For instance, the continuity case displayed in the north-east panel in Figure 3 witness that
the policy identiﬁed by (ρπ =0 .2,ρ x =0 .25) - which implies the unconditional volatilities
(σx =4 .74,σπ =3 .41) -i sPareto superior with respect to the policy (ρπ =0 .3,ρ x =0 .25) -
that delivers (σx =4 .80,σπ =3 .73).
[insert Figure 2 about here]
4.1 Monetary Policy, Macroeconomic Persistence, and Volatility
The results presented so far point towards a switch in the relationship between monetary
policy tightness and inﬂation-output volatility when moving from passive to active monetary
policy. Under passive monetary policy, such relationship is direct, while under active monetary
policy is inverse. To better understand this link, it is interesting to analyze the link between
monetary policy and persistence, and the link between persistence and volatility. Concentrate
on the latter, and consider the following reduced form autoregressive process:
zt = φ1zt−1 + φ2zt−2 + ... + φnzt−n + ξz
t (5)
10A closed form solution for the volatility ratio can be easily computed for a version of the model displaying no
endogenous persistence, i.e. w = b =0 . In fact, given the white noise nature of the structural shocks, Etπt+1 =













Under determinacy (i.e. ρπ > 1),t h i si m p l i e s
∂(σπ/σx)
∂ρπ < 0 - for whatever admissible parameterization - which
proves the statement in the text.
11The plots regarding the indeterminacy scenarios do not include the pair (σx,σ π) obtained with ρπ =1 ,ρ x =
0 because of the out-of-scale volatility of inﬂation registered.
7with zt representing a generic macroeconomic variable, and ξt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σ2
ξ).W ed e ﬁne
the degree of persistence of this process as zφ ≡
Pn
j=0 φj. Then, the unconditional volatility





Obviously, given the volatility of the white noise shock of the process ξt, the more persistent
z, the higher its unconditional volatility σz. Then, to our purposes it is key to verify if zφ
increases under indeterminacy and decreases under determinacy. If so, we could argue that
monetary policy aﬀects the persistence of inﬂation and the output gap, and consequently their
volatilities (and their volatility ratio).
We perform this check by ﬁtting the simulated time series of inﬂation and the output
gap with an autogregressive model as (5), and confronting the estimated persistence with the
unconditional volatilities computed as described before.12
We plot our results in Figure 3 (inﬂation) and Figure 4 (output). Figure 3 shows an inter-
esting positive correlation between the estimated inﬂation persistence and the unconditional
inﬂation volatility when plotted against the policy parameter ρπ.13 Indeed, this plot conﬁrms
that as long as the Taylor principle is not met, the tighter the monetary policy management,
the higher the inﬂation persistence, the higher the inﬂation volatility. The switch to activeness
pays oﬀ, because it dramatically reduces inﬂation volatility, so delivering a better outcome for
the Society.
[insert Figure 3 about here]
Figure 4 completes the picture. It emerges that a fairly robust correlation also characterizes
the volatility and persistence of the output gap.14 Interestingly, the standard deviation of the
output gap is curbed by an increase of ρπ as long as a passive monetary policy is implemented,
while it is enhanced under uniqueness. It is then not surprising that the overall eﬀect on the
volatility ratio (Figure 2) is basically the opposite under the two monetary policy scenarios.
[insert Figure 4 about here]
These results oﬀer a very new ﬁnding to the monetary policy literature regarding the
mechanism linking systematic monetary policy, inﬂation and output persistence, and their
12We admit up to four lags for the process (5). For each OLS estimated model, the number of lags was
selected according to the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion. Of course, the dynamics expressed by the reduced
form of model (1)-(3) is not necessarily captured by the simple, univariate autoregressive model we employ for
measuring the persistence of the simulated series, that just represent a ﬁrst approximation of it.
13Under continuity, the correlations between volatility and persistence amounts to 0.90 (top panel) and 0.83
(bottom panel). Under orthogonality, 0.87 (top panel) and 0.81 (bottom panel).
14Under continuity, the correlations between volatility and persistence amounts to 0.82 (top panel) and 0.91
(bottom panel). Under orthogonality, 0.83 (top panel) and 0.93 (bottom panel).
8volatilities. Interestingly, it emerges that, inc a s eo fas w i t c hi nt h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yr e g i m e
in an otherwise unchanged model, the persistence of the inﬂation and output gap processes
stemming from such model may vary quite signiﬁcantly. This ﬁnding seems to represent a
warning on the use of long-samples featured by the presence of structural policy break when
estimating structural schedules. Indeed, such exercises may lead to ﬂawed results due to model
misspeciﬁcation.15
4.2 Indeterminacy and the Great Moderation
The observations of the volatilities of the U.S. economy in the last four decades suggest that
the last two decades have been featured by a much lower volatility of inﬂation and the output
gap. Figure 5 depicts 5-year moving averages that clearly show that, in ﬁrst approximation,
two regimes may be identiﬁed. In the the ﬁrst regime, the average standard deviation of
inﬂation is 2.20, and that of the output gap is 2.68. In the second regime, such ﬁgures drop
respectively to 1.00 and 2.03.16 Notice that this is not a ﬁnding one may easily explain by
employing the standard Taylor curve. In fact, the volatility trade-oﬀ predicts a raise (fall) of
the output gap volatility in reaction to a fall (raise) of the standard deviation of inﬂation.
[insert Figure 5 about here]
Interestingly, two recent contributions point towards a possible break-down of the standard
inﬂation/output trade-oﬀ. Branch et al (2004) show that a model in which ﬁrms choose their
information acquisition rate by minimizing a loss function that depends on expected forecast
errors and information costs. The central bank aims at minimizing a penalty function whose
arguments are the expected volatility of the cross-sectional price and that of the output
gap. When moving towards a tighter policy against price ﬂuctuations, a direct eﬀect on
the volatility of output (that increases) is exerted - but an indirect eﬀect, channeled by a
decrease of the optimal information acquisition rate - tends to reduce such volatility. It
turns out that there is no trade-oﬀ between the price level stabilization and the output gap
stabilization as long as the central bank’s focus on the output gap stabilization is high enough.
Then, the great moderation may be explained by a shift in the degree of the relative policy
aggressiveness against price-level volatility. Orphanides and Williams (2004) propose a set
up in which agents "perpetually" learn about the structure of the economy, i.e. agents have
15For a nice paper showing how severely biased the estimates of a Phillips curve in such context may be,
see Surico (2005). A recent application by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) shows how to deal with indetermi-
nacy in estimating a DSGE monetary policy model, while Castelnuovo and Surico (2005) show that inﬂation
expectations are important in SVAR analysis in sub-samples characterized by passive monetary policy.
16First regime, sample: 1966Q1-1979Q3. Second regime, sample: 1982Q4-2005Q3. The inﬂation rate is the
annualized quarterly variation of the GDP deﬂator. The output gap is measured as the log-diﬀerence between
real GDP and the measure of potential output of the Congressional Budget Oﬃce. The series employed in
this analysis were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website in January 2006, and are
available upon request.
9an imperfect knowledge of the economic structure and infer about it at a constant pace via
a recursive least square formula that places greater weight on more recent observations. It
turns out that, for a Phillips curve in which inﬂation expectations have a great weight in
shaping inﬂation realizations, and for "low enough" policymakers preferences over inﬂation
stabilization, the inﬂation/output tradeoﬀ may break down. This happens because in their
model inﬂation expectations persistently deviate from rational expectations, so becoming a
source of instability and providing an additional role for monetary policy.
The results we presented above candidate the monetary policy switch story as another
(possibly complementary) explanation of the Great Moderation. Indeed, by looking at Figures
3 and 4 it is easy to realize that both volatilities fall once the central banker has moved to
an aggressive enough monetary policy. Clarida et al (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
propose estimates for the parameter ρπ of about 0.70 − 0.90 for the pre-Volcker era, and
close to 2 under the Volcker-Greenspan monetary policy regime. The estimates for the ρx are
surrounded by higher uncertainty, but the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, above all in
the Greenspan sample. By associating these estimates to the volatilities in Figures 3 and 4, it
emerges that the shift from passive to active monetary policy might really represent (one of)
the explanation(s) of the reduction of the macroeconomic volatilities in the last two decades
in the United States.
The next Section shows how robust our ﬁndings are to some perturbations to our bench-
mark parameterization.
5 Robustness Check
We discuss here some of the robustness check we implemented. First, we enrich the Taylor
rule (3) with an interest rate smoothing argument, i.e. we consider the rule
Rt =( 1− ρ)(ρππt + ρyxt)+ρRt−1 + εMP
t
The empirical relevance of the lagged coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule has been supported e.g.
by Clarida et al (2000). In line with several empirical contributions, we set the degree of
interest rate smoothing at a high value, i.e. ρ =0 .7. T h er e s u l t st u r no u tt ob eq u a l i t a t i v e l y
in line with the ones presented above. Interestingly, a comparison between Figures 2 vs. 6
and 3 vs. 7 highlights the role played by the interest rate smoothing in inﬂuencing inﬂation
expectations and reducing the volatility of inﬂation (while slightly augmenting that of the
output gap), an eﬀect already discussed by e.g. Woodford (2003).17 As a second empirical
check, we substituted the Taylor rule (3) with its deterministic counterpart, i.e. we set σ2
εMP =
17The computation of the loss function L = σπ + λyσy for various scenarios under analysis conﬁrmed that,
for values of λy belonging to the [0,0.5] interval, the interest rate smoothing eﬀect is beneﬁcial for the Society
both under continuity and under orthogonality.
100. We did so to line up with the contributions computing the Taylor curves either under
optimal monetary policy (typically not embedding a policy shock) or deterministic simple
rules. Figures 10-13 depict the results under this hypothesis. The results conﬁrm what
already discuss. As a further check concerning the policy rule, we modiﬁed it in order to
enable policymakers to react to expected inﬂation ﬂuctuations, i.e.
Rt = ρπEtπt+1 + ρyxt + εMP
t
Once more, the qualitative messages of the paper turn out to be robust (see Figures 14-
17). Another perturbation we tried is that of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ,w h o s e
benchmark value is equal to 1. We set it equal to 5, and remade our simulations.18 Figures
18-21 seem to conﬁrm our main results. Finally, given the huge uncertainty surrounding the
importance of automatic adjustments for the formation of inﬂation, we repeat our simulations
with a much lower value for the share of the ﬁrms who automatically adjust their prices when
not allowed to reoptimize, i.e. w =0 .3.F i g u r e s2 2 - 2 5c o n ﬁrm the robustness of our ﬁndings.
[insert Figures 6-25 about here]
6C o n c l u s i o n s
If monetary policymakers react too weakly to inﬂation oscillations and the Taylor principle
is not met, sunspot ﬂuctuations of the macroeconomic variables may arise. In this scenario,
the inﬂation/output volatility works in a very particular manner, i.e. the inﬂation/volatility
ratio raises when the monetary policy becomes more aggressive. The reason for this results is
likely to be the impact that monetary policy has on inﬂation and output persistence. Under
indeterminacy, such an inﬂuence is positive, i.e. the more aggressive the central bank, the more
persistent inﬂation, and the less persistent the output gap. Under determinacy, it happens
right the opposite. This result may then explain our ﬁnding on the inﬂation/volatility ratio,
and is qualitatively in line with the facts regarding the observed volatilities and volatility
ratios in the U.S. (as well as other industrialized countries).
We think our ﬁndings call for a better understanding of the macroeconomic behavior under
passive monetary policy. Recent contributions by Fuhrer (2005) and Angeloni et al (2005)
discuss diﬀerent possible sources of the inﬂation persistence. This paper candidates sunspot
ﬂuctuations as a main driver of inﬂa t i o ni ns p e c i ﬁc subsamples, and underlines the importance
of relating the persistence of inﬂation to the monetary policy conduct. The fact that under
diﬀerent policy regimes the persistence of the main macroeconomic series may dramatically
18Such value for the relative risk aversion implies that the inverse of the sacriﬁce ratio is κ =0 .1650,m u c h
more in line with some of the estimates in the literature.
11change seems to be a warning on the reliability of the econometric results obtained with long
samples incorporating diﬀerent, regime-speciﬁc sub-samples.
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Figure 1. Taylor curves under uniqueness: Benchmark Model. Parameterization
d e s c r i b e di nt h et e x t
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Figure 2. Taylor curves under indeterminacy: Benchmark model.
Parameterization as indicated in the text.
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Figure 3. Inﬂation volatility/persistence vs. policy parameter ρπ.L e f ty - a x i s :
Standard deviation of inﬂation; right y-axis: Inﬂation persistence.







ρx = 0.25, continuity
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St. dev. output gap
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Figure 4. Output gap volatility/persistence vs. policy parameter ρπ.L e f ty - a x i s :
Standard deviation of the output gap; right y-axis: Output gap persistence.





















































Figure 5. Volatility of inﬂation and the output gap, sample: 1966Q1-2005Q3.
Standard deviations computed as 5-year moving averages (rolling windows). The x-axis
reports the last quarter of some of the 5-year windows employed in the computation of the
standard deviations.
16Technical Appendix: Solution of the LRE Model
The linear rational expectations model described by equations (1)-(3) can be cast in the
following canonical form:
Γ0(θ)st = Γ1(θ)st−1 + Ψ(θ)εt + Π(θ)ηt (7)




t]0 is the vector of l fundamental shocks, ηt =[ ( xt−Et−1xt),(πt−Et−1πt)]0 collects
the k rational expectations forecast errors, and θ =[ ρπ,ρ x,ρ,β,w,κ,b,σ,σ2
επ,σ2
εx] is the vector
of the parameters of the model outlined in the previous section.
In order to transform the canonical form and solve the model, we follow Sims (2001) and
exploit the generalized complex Schur decomposition (QZ) of the matrices Γ0 and Γ1.T h i s
corresponds to computing the matrices Q, Z, Λ and ∆ such that QQ0 = ZZ0 = In, Λ and ∆
are upper triangular, Γ0 = Q0ΛZ and Γ1 = Q0∆Z.D e ﬁning wt = Z0st and pre-multiplying





















(Ψεt + Πηt) (8)
where, without loss of generality, the vector of generalized eigenvalues λ, which is the vector of
the ratios between the diagonal elements of ∆ and Λ, has been partitioned such that the lower
block collects all the explosive eigenvalues. The matrices ∆, Λ and Q have been partitioned
accordingly, and therefore Qj. collects the blocks of rows that correspond to the stable (j =1 )
and unstable (j =2 )eigenvalues respectively.
The explosive block of (8) can be rewritten as:19
w2,t = Λ−1
22 ∆22w2,t−1 + Λ−1
22 Q2.(Ψεt + Πηt) (9)
Given the set of m equations (9), a non-explosive solution of the linear rational expectations
model (7) for st requires w2,t =0∀t ≥ 0. T h i sc a nb eo b t a i n e db ys e t t i n gw2,0 =0and choosing
for every vector εt the endogenous forecast error ηt that satisﬁes the following condition
Q2.(Ψεt + Πηt)=0 (10)
A general stable solution for the endogenous forecast error can be computed through a singular
















,w h e r eD11 is a diagonal matrix
19It is possible to have some zero-elements on the main diagonal of Λ22. In this case, the latter matrix is
not invertible. The ’solving-forward’ solution proposed by Sims (2001) and extended by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) overcomes this problem. A Technical Appendix with a more detailed discussion of the solution strategy
is available from the authors upon request.
17and D and U are orthonormal matrices. Using this decomposition, Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) show that in equilibrium the vector of endogenous forecast errors reads as follows:
ηt =( −V 0
.1D−1
11 U.1Q2.Ψ + V.2f M)εt + V.2ζt (11)
where f M is the (k − r)xl matrix governing the inﬂuence of the sunspot shock on the model
dynamics.
Assuming that Γ−1
0 exists, the solution (11) can be combined with (7) to yield the following






.1Q2.Ψ + Π∗V.2f M
i
εt + Π∗V.2ζt (12)
where a generic X∗ = Γ−1
0 X.
In general, we can be confronted with three cases. If the number of endogenous forecast
errors k is equal to the number of nonzero singular values r, the system is determined and
the stability condition (10) uniquely determines ηt.I ns u c hac a s e ,V.2 =0 , then the last two
addends of (12) drop out. This implies that the dynamics of st is purely a function of the
structural parameters θ.
If the number of endogenous forecast errors k exceeds the number of nonzero singular val-
ues r, the system is indeterminate and sunspot ﬂuctuations can arise. Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) show that this can inﬂuence the solution along two dimensions. First, sunspot ﬂuctua-
tions ζt can aﬀect the equilibrium dynamics. Second, the transmission of fundamental shocks
εt is no longer uniquely identiﬁed as the elements of f M are not pinned down by the structure
of the linear rational expectations model.
Alternatively, the number of endogenous forecast errors k can be smaller than the number
of nonzero singular values r, and then the system has no solutions. These three conditions
generalize the procedure in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) of counting the number of unstable
roots and predetermined variables.20
In order to compute f M and then the solutions of the model under indeterminacy, it is
necessary to impose some additional restrictions on the endogenous forecast errors. Following
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we choose f M such that the impulse responses ∂st
∂ε0
t associated
with the system (12) are continuous at the boundary between the determinacy and the inde-
terminacy region. This solution is labelled "continuity". As an alternative, we compute the
solution of the model under indeterminacy by imposing f M =0 can be computed using the
assumption that the eﬀects of the sunspot shocks are orthogonal to the eﬀects of the structural
shocks. This identiﬁcation yields results, not reported but available upon request, that are
qualitatively similar to the ﬁndings for the continuity case.
20The solution method proposed by Sims (2001) has the advantage that it does not require the separation of
predetermined variables from "jump" variables. Rather, it recognizes that in equilibrium models expectational
residuals are attached to equations and that the structure of the coeﬃcient matrices in the canonical form
implicitly selects the linear combination of variables that needs to be predetermined for a solution to exist.
18Let ΘI and ΘD be the sets of all possible vectors of parameters θ0s in the indeterminacy
and determinacy region respectively. For every vector θ ∈ ΘI we identify a corresponding
vector
∼
θ ∈ ΘD that lies on the boundary of the two regions and choose f M such that the
response of st to εt conditional on θ mimics the response conditional on
∼
θ. This corresponds






.1Q2.Ψ + Π∗V.2f M (13)




(e θ)=B1(e θ) (14)








B1(e θ) − B1(θ)
i
(15)
and use (15) to calculate the solution of the model in (11) and (12).
The new vector
∼
θ is obtained from θ by replacing ρπ with the condition that marks the
boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy region in the system (1)-(3). Woodford
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Figure 6. Robustness check, interest rate smoothing. [ρ =0 .7]
















































































































Figure 7. Robustness check, interest rate smoothing.[ ρ =0 .7]
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Figure 8. Robustness check with interest rate smoothing. [ρ =0 .7]
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Figure 9. Robustness check with interest rate smoothing. [ρ =0 .7]







































































































Figure 10. Robustness check with determinist Taylor rule. [σMP
ε =0 ]















































































































Figure 11. Robustness check with determinist Taylor rule. [σMP
ε =0 ]
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Figure 1: Figure 13. Robustness check with determinist Taylor rule. [σMP
ε =0 ]
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Figure 12. Robustness check with determinist Taylor rule. [σMP
ε =0 ]
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Figure 14. Robustness check with forward looking Taylor rule.
















































































































Figure 15. Robustness check with forward looking Taylor rule.
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Figure 2: Figure 17. Robustness check with forward looking Taylor rule.
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Figure 16. Robustness check with forward looking Taylor rule.







































































































Figure 18. Robustness check with high relative risk aversion. [σ =5 ]














































































































Figure 19. Robustness check with high relative risk aversion. [σ =5 ]
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Figure 20. Robustness check with high relative risk aversion. [σ =5 ]
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Figure 21. Robustness check with high relative risk aversion. [σ =5 ]































































St. dev. output gap
ρx = 0.50




























Figure 22. Robustness check with a lower degree of automatic price adjustment.
[w =0 .3]


















































































































Figure 23. Robustness check with a lower degree of automatic price adjustment.
[w =0 .3]
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Figure 24. Robustness check with a lower degree of automatic price adjustment.
[w =0 .3]
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Figure 25. Robustness check with a lower degree of automatic price adjustment.
[w =0 .3]
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